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Abstract. Flow-sensitive analysis for information-flow control (IFC) al-
lows data structures to have mutable security labels, i.e., labels that can
change over the course of the computation. This feature is often used
to boost the permissiveness of the IFC monitor, by rejecting fewer runs
of programs, and to reduce the burden of explicit label annotations.
However, adding flow-sensitive constructs (e.g., references or files) to a
dynamic IFC system is subtle and may also introduce high-bandwidth
covert channels. In this work, we extend LIO—a language-based floating-
label system—with flow-sensitive references. The key insight to safely
manipulating the label of a reference is to not only consider the label on
the data stored in the reference, i.e., the reference label, but also the label
on the reference label itself. Taking this into consideration, we provide an
upgrade primitive that can be used to change the label of a reference in
a safe manner. We additionally provide a mechanism for automatic up-
grades to eliminate the burden of determining when a reference should be
upgraded. This approach naturally extends to a concurrent setting, which
has not been previously considered by dynamic flow-sensitive systems.
For both our sequential and concurrent calculi we prove non-interference
by embedding the flow-sensitive system into the original, flow-insensitive
LIO calculus—a surprising result on its own.
1 Introduction
Modern software systems are composed of many complex components that han-
dle sensitive data. In many cases (e.g., mobile and web applications) these dis-
parate components are provided by different authors, of varying trustworthi-
ness. Unfortunately, because today’s software development tools do not provide
a means for protecting sensitive data from untrusted code, data theft and cor-
ruption is prevalent.
Information-flow control (IFC) is a promising approach to security that pro-
vides data confidentiality and integrity in the presence of untrusted code. At a
high level, IFC tracks and controls the flow of information through a system ac-
cording to a security policy, usually non-interference [15]. Non-interference states
that public events should not depend on sensitive data and dually, trusted data
should not be affected by untrusted events. Hence, with IFC, the program is
guaranteed to preserve data confidentiality and integrity, even when composed
of untrusted components. Indeed, this appealing guarantee has recently led to
significant research and development efforts that use IFC to secure web applica-
tions (e.g., [9, 14, 17, 41]) and mobile platforms (e.g., [11, 20]).
To ensure data confidentiality and integrity, these dynamic IFC systems as-
sociate security labels with data and monitor where such data can flow [25, 37].
In this paper, we use the labelsH and L, to respectively denote secret and public
data, and ensure that information cannot flow from a secret entity into a public
one, i.e., the labels are ordered such that L ⊑ H and H 6⊑ L. In general,
the partial order ⊑ (label check) is used to govern the allowed flows. We re-
mark that our results apply to arbitrary lattices that may also express integrity
concerns [25, 37], we only use the two-point lattice for simplicity of exposition.
One of the facets of IFC analysis lies in how such labels, when associated
with objects, are treated [19]. Specifically, some IFC systems (e.g., [8, 10, 18, 21,
35, 36, 44]) treat labels on objects as immutable and do not allow for changes
over the lifetime of the program, i.e., labels of objects are flow-insensitive. In
contrast, other systems (e.g., [2, 3, 43]) are flow-sensitive, i.e., they allow object
labels to change, in certain conditions, according to the sensitivity of the data
that is stored in the object. In general, these flow-sensitive systems are more
permissive, i.e., they allow programs that flow-insensitive monitors would reject.
Consider, for instance, a web application that writes to a labeled log while
servicing user requests. If the label of the log is L, a flow-insensitive IFC monitor
would disallow writing any sensitive data (e.g., error messages containing user-
supplied data) to the log, since this would constitute a leak. However, in a
flow-sensitive system, the label of the log can change (to H), as to accommodate
the kinds of data being written to the log. For many applications, allowing labels
to change in such a way is very desirable—it alleviates the burden of having to
a-priori determine the precise labels of objects (e.g., the log).
l := True
tmp := False
if h then tmp := True
if ¬ tmp then l := False
Fig. 1: Flow-sensitive attack
Unfortunately, naively introducing flow-
sensitive objects to a dynamic IFC system
can turn label changes into a covert chan-
nel [31]. Consider the code fragment of Fig-
ure 1 where references l and h are respectively
labeled L and H. By naively allowing arbi-
trary label changes—even if the new label is
more restricting—we can leak the contents of
h into l . In particular, suppose that the tem-
porary variable tmp is initially labeled L. If
the value stored in h is True, then in the first
conditional we assign True into tmp and raise its label to H, reflecting the fact
that the branch condition depends on sensitive data. Since the tmp is True, the
branch condition for the second conditional is False and thus the value and label
of l are left intact, i.e., True at L. However, if h is False, then the value and label
of tmp do not change—the first assignment is not executed. Instead, the second
assignment, which sets l to False, is performed; since the label of the branch
condition is L, the label of l remains L. Note that in both cases the label of l
stays L, but the value of l is the same as the secret h. (Hence why label change
is considered a covert channel.) In systems such as LIO and Breeze, which allow
labels to be inspected, this attack can be further simplified by simply checking
the label of tmp after the first assignment—if the secret is true then the label
will be H, otherwise it will be L.
This attack is not new, and, to ensure that the covert channel is not intro-
duced when adding flow-sensitive references in such a way, several solutions have
already been proposed. These solutions fall into roughly three categories. First,
the IFC monitor can incorporate static information to ensure that such leaks are
disallowed [31]. Second, the IFC monitor can forbid certain label changes, de-
pending on the context (e.g., the program counter (pc) label [33]). For instance,
the no-sensitive upgrades policy disallows raising the label of a public reference
in a sensitive context (e.g., when a branch condition is H) [2, 43]. And, third,
the monitor can disallow branches that depend on certain variables, for which
the label was mutated, as done by the permissive upgrades policy [3].
In this paper, we take a fresh perspective on flow-sensitivity in the context
of coarse-grained floating-label systems, in particular, the LIO IFC system [35,
36]. LIO brings ideas from IFC Operating Systems—notably, HiStar [44]—into
a language-based setting. In particular, LIO takes an OS-like coarse-grained
approach by associating a single “current” floating-label with a computation
(and everything in scope), instead of heterogeneously labeling every variable,
as typically done by language-based systems (e.g., [27, 34]). This floating-label
is raised (e.g., from L to H) to accommodate reading sensitive data and thus
serves as a form of “taint” reflecting the sensitive of data in context, i.e., LIO is
flow-sensitive in the current label. (This can be seen as raising the pc in more
traditional language-based systems.) In turn, the LIO monitor uses the “current”
label to restrict where the computation can write (e.g., once the current label is
raised to H, it can no longer write to references labeled L). However, like other
IFC systems, LIO is flow-insensitive in object labels.
This work extends the LIO IFC system, both the sequential and concurrent
versions, to incorporate flow-sensitive references. A key insight of this work is to
consider labels of references as being composed of two elements: the reference
label describing the confidentiality (integrity) of the stored value, and another
label, called the label on the label, which describes the confidentiality (integrity)
of the reference label itself. Our monitor, then only forbids changing a label of
a reference if the label on the label is below the current floating-label. Inspired
by [17], we add a primitive for safely and explicitly upgrading labels. This boosts
the permissiveness of LIO, and, for instance, allows programs, such at the logging
web application described above, which would otherwise be rejected by the IFC
monitor.
To reduce the burden of introducing upgrade annotations, our calculus pro-
vides a means for automatically upgrading references for which the computation
is about to “lose” write access, i.e., before tainting the computation by raising
the current label, we first upgrade all the references whose labels are below the
(new) current label. While secure, this feature facilitates a form of label creep,
wherein all flow-sensitive references might end up with labels that are “too high.”
To further address this, we propose a block-structured primitive which only up-
grades the labels of declared flow-sensitive references, while disallowing writes
to undeclared ones.
By taking a fresh perspective on flow-sensitivity, we also show that our
flow-sensitive extension can be entirely encoded using existing flow-insensitive
constructs—the key insight is to explicitly model flow-sensitive values as nested
flow-insensitive labeled references. In the context of LIO, this encoding has the
added benefit of allowing us to prove non-interference by simply invoking pre-
vious results. Equally important, the sequential semantics for LIO with flow-
sensitive references directly extend to the concurrent setting.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
– We extend LIO to incorporate flow-sensitive objects, with a focus on ref-
erences. Specifically, we introduce two explicit primitives to safely raise
(upgrade) or downgrade (downgrade) the security label of references. This
extension not only increases LIO’s permissiveness, but also provides a means
for safely combining flow-insensitive and flow-sensitive references.
– We present a uniform treatment for flow-insensitive and flow-sensitive refer-
ences in both sequential and concurrent settings. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first to analyze the challenges of purely dynamic monitors
with flow-sensitive references in the presence of concurrency.
– A non-interference proof for the different calculi that leverages the encoding
of flow-sensitive references using flow-insensitive constructs.
The novel aspect of this article, with respect to its conference version [7],
is the extension of our formal results to consider a downgrade primitive that
further boosts permissiveness. Additionally, we compare our approach with no-
sensitive-upgrade [43] and permissive-upgrade [2]—two known policies for label
changes.
We remark that while our development focuses on LIO, we believe that
our results generalize to other sequential and concurrent floating-label systems
(e.g., [10, 18, 21, 44]).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an intro-
duction to LIO and its formalization. Section 3 presents our flow-sensitivity
extensions and enforcement mechanism. Section 4 extends this approach to the
concurrent setting. Section 5 presents the embedding of our enforcement using
flow-insensitive constructs, from which our formal security guarantees follow. We
discuss related work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
2 Introduction to LIO
LIO is a language-level IFC system, implemented as a library in Haskell. The
library provides a new monad, LIO , atop which programmers implement com-
putations, which may use the LIO API to perform side effects (e.g., mutate a
reference or write to a file).
Values v ::= True | False | () | λx .t | ℓ | LIOTCB t
Terms t ::= v | x | t t | fix t | if t then t else t
| t ⊗ t | return t | t >>= t | getLabel
Types τ ::= Bool | () | τ → τ | ℓ | LIO τ
Opsℓ ⊗ ::= ⊔ | ⊓ |⊑
Fig. 2: Syntactic categories for base λLIOℓ .
The LIO monad implements a purely dynamic execution monitor. Specifi-
cally, LIO encapsulates the state necessary to enforce IFC for the computation
under evaluation. Part of this state is the current (floating) label. Intuitively, the
current label serves a role similar to the program counter (pc) of more-traditional
IFC systems (e.g., [34]): it is used to restrict the current computation from per-
forming side-effects that may compromise the confidentiality or integrity of data
(e.g., by restricting where the current computation may write).
To soundly reason about IFC, every piece of data must be labeled, including
literals, terms, and labels themselves. However and different from most language-
based systems (e.g., [18, 26, 34]) where every value is explicitly labeled, LIO
takes a coarse-grained approach and uses the current label to protect all values
in scope. As in IFC operating systems [10, 44], in LIO, the current label lcur is
the label on all the non-explicitly labeled values in the context of a computation.
To allow for computations on resistive data, LIO raises the current label to
protect newly read data. That is, the current label is raised to “float” above the
labels of all the objects read by the current computation. Raising the current
label allows computations to flexibly read data, at the cost of being more limited
in where they can subsequently write. Concretely, a computation with current
label lcur can read data labeled ld by raising its current label to l
′
cur = lcur ⊔ ld ,
but can thereafter only write to entities labeled le if l
′
cur ⊑ le . Hence, for
example, a public LIO computation can read secret data by first raising lcur from
L to H. Importantly, however, the new current label prevents the computation
from subsequently writing to public entities.
2.1 λLIOℓ : A coarse-grained IFC calculus
We give the precise semantics for LIO by extending the simply-typed, call-by-
name λ-calculus; we call this extended IFC calculus λLIOℓ . The formal syntax of
the core λLIOℓ calculus, parametric in the label type ℓ, is given in Fig. 2. Syntactic
categories v , t , and τ represent values, terms, and types, respectively. Values
include standard primitives (Booleans, unit, and λ-abstractions) and terminals
corresponding to labels (ℓ) and monadic values (LIOTCB t).3 We note that values
of the form LIOTCB t denote computations subject to security checks. (In fact,
3 We restrict our formalization to computations implemented in the LIO monad and
only consider Haskell features relevant to IFC, similar to the presentation of LIO
in [38].
E ::= E t | fix E | if E then t else t | E ⊗ t | v ⊗ E
E ::= [ ] | E | E>>= t
getLabel
Σ = (lcur, ...)
〈Σ|E [getLabel ]〉 −→ 〈Σ|E [return lcur ]〉
Fig. 4: Evaluation contexts and getLabel reduction rule.
security checks are only applied to such values.) Terms are composed of stan-
dard constructs (values, variables x , function application, the fix operator, and
conditionals), terminals corresponding to label operations (t ⊗ t , where ⊔ is the
join, ⊓ is the meet, and ⊑ is the partial-order on labels), standard monadic op-
erators (return t and t >>= t), and getLabel, a term for inspecting the current
label, as further explained below. We do not consider terms annotated with · TCB
as part of the surface syntax, i.e., such syntax nodes are not made available to
programmers and are solely used internally in our semantic description. Types
consist of Booleans, unit, function types, labels, and LIO computations; since
the λLIOℓ type system is standard, we do not discuss it further.
We include monadic terms in our calculus since (in Haskell) monads dic-
tate the evaluation order of a program and encapsulate all side-effects, including
I/O [24, 40]; LIO leverages monads to precisely control what (side-effecting) op-
erations the programmer is allowed to perform at any given time.
do x ← t
return (x + 1)
Fig. 3: do-notation
In particular, an LIO program is simply a computation
in the LIO monad, composed from simpler monadic
terms using return and bind. Term return t produces
a computation which simply returns the value denoted
by t . Term >>=, called bind, is used to sequence LIO
computations. Specifically, term t>>=(λx .t ′) takes the
result produced by term t and applies function λx .t ′ to
it. (This operator allows computation t ′ to depend on
the value produced by t .) We sometimes use Haskell’s
do-notation to write such monadic computations. For example, the term t >>=
λx .return (x + 1), which simply adds 1 to the value produced by the term t ,
can be written using do-notation as shown in Figure 3.
A top-level λLIOℓ computation is a configuration of the form 〈Σ|t〉, where t is
the monadic term and Σ is the state associated with the term. As in [35, 36], we
take an imperative approach to modeling the LIO state as a separate component
of the configuration (as opposed to being part of the term). We partially define
the state of λLIOℓ to (at least) contain the current label lcur, i.e., Σ = (lcur, ...);
here, ... denotes other parts of the state not relevant at this point. Under this
definition, a top-level well-typed λLIOℓ term has the form ∆,Γ ⊢ t : LIO τ , where
∆ is the store typing, and Γ is the usual type environment.
v ::= · · · | LbTCB l t
t ::= · · · | label t t | unlabel t | labelOf t
τ ::= · · · | Labeled τ
E ::= · · · | label E t | unlabel E | labelOf E
label
Σ = (lcur, ...) lcur ⊑ l
〈Σ|E [label l t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ|E [return (LbTCB l t)]〉
unlabel
Σ = (lcur, ...) l
′
cur = lcur ⊔ l Σ
′ = (l′cur, ...)
〈Σ|E [unlabel (LbTCB l t)]〉 −→ 〈Σ′|E [return t ]〉
labelOf
E [labelOf (LbTCB l t)] −→ E [l ]
Fig. 5: Extending base λLIOℓ with labeled values.
We use evaluation contexts in the style of Felleisen and Hieb to specify the
reduction rules for λLIOℓ [12]. Figure 4 defines the evaluation contexts for pure
terms (E) and monadic terms (E) for the base λLIOℓ . The definitions are standard;
we solely highlight that monadic terms are evaluated only at the outermost use
of bind (E >>= t), as in Haskell. For the base λLIOℓ , we also give the reduction
rule for the monadic term getLabel, which simply retrieves the current label.
As shown later, it is precisely this label that is used to restrict the reads/writes
performed by the current computation. The rest of the reduction rules for the
base calculus are straight forward and given Appendix A.
2.2 Labeled values
Using lcur as the label on all terms in scope makes it trivial to deal with implicit
flows. Branch conditions, which are simply values of type Bool , are already
implicitly labeled with lcur. Consequently, all the subsequent writes cannot leak
this bit—the current label restricts all the possible writes. However, this coarse-
grained labeling approach suffers from a severe restriction: a piece of code cannot,
for example, write a public value (e.g., 42) to a public channel labeled L after
observing secret data, even if the value is independent from the secret—once
secret data is read, the current label is raised to H thereby “over tainting” the
public data in scope.
To address this limitation, LIO provides Labeled values. A Labeled value is a
term that is explicitly protected by a label, other than the current label. Figure 5
shows the extension of the base λLIOℓ with Labeled values.
The label terminal is used to explicitly label a term. As rule (label) shows,
label l t associates the supplied label l with term t by wrapping the term with
the LbTCB constructor. Importantly, it first asserts that the new label (l), which
will used to protect t , is at least as restricting as the current label, i.e., lcur ⊑ l .
Dually, terminal unlabel unwraps explicitly labeled values. As defined in
rule (unlabel), given a labeled value LbTCB l t , unlabel returns the wrapped
term t . Since the returned term is no longer explicitly labeled by l , and is instead
protected by the current label, lcur must be at least as restricting as l . To ensure
this, the current label is raised from lcur to lcur ⊔ l , capturing the fact that the
remaining computation might depend on t . This rule highlights the fact that
the current label always “floats” above the labels of the values observed by the
current computation.
The labelOf function provides a means for inspecting the label of a labeled
value. As detailed by reduction rule (labelOf), given a labeled value LbTCB l t ,
the function returns the label l protecting term t . This allows code to check
the label of a labeled value before deciding to unlabel it, and thereby raising
the current label. It it worth noting that regardless of the current label in the
configuration, the label of a labeled value can be inspected—hence labels are
effectively “public.”4
A common problem with dynamic IFC systems is label creep [33]—the rais-
ing of the current label to a point where the computation can no longer do
anything useful. To avoid label creep, LIO provides toLabeled as a way to al-
low the current label to be temporarily raised during the execution of a given
computation. We extend the terms and the pure evaluation context as t ::=
· · · | toLabeled t t and E ::= · · · | toLabeled E t , respectively, and give the
precise semantics for toLabeled as follows:
toLabeled
Σ = (lcur, ...) lcur ⊑ l
〈Σ|t〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′|LIOTCB t ′〉 Σ′ = (l′cur, ...) l
′
cur ⊑ l Σ
′′ = Σ ⋉ Σ′
〈Σ|E [toLabeled l t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ′′|E [label l t ′ ]〉
If the current label at the point of executing toLabeled l t is lcur, toLabeled
evaluates t to completion (〈Σ|t〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′|LIOTCB t ′〉) and restores the current
label to lcur, i.e., toLabeled provides a separate context in which t is evaluated.
(Here, the state merge function ⋉ is defined as: Σ ⋉ Σ′ , Σ, in the next
section we present an alternative definition.) We note that returning the result
of evaluating t directly (e.g., as 〈Σ|E [toLabeled l t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ′′|E [t ′ ]〉) would
allow for trivial leaks; thus, toLabeled labels t ′ with l (〈Σ′′|E [label l t ′ ]〉).
This effectively states that the result of t is protected by label l , as opposed to
the current label (l′cur) at the point t completed. Importantly, this requires that
the result not be more sensitive than l , i.e., l′cur ⊑ l .
4 Since labeled values can be nested, this only applies to the labels of top-level labeled
values. Indeed, even these labels are not public—they are protected by the current
label. However, since code can always observe objects labeled at the current label,
this is akin to being public.
v ::= · · · | RefTCBfi l a
t ::= · · · | newRefs t t | writeRefs t t | readRefs t
| labelOfs t | copyRef t t
τ ::= · · · | Refs τ
E ::= · · · | newRefs E t | writeRefs E t | readRefs E
| labelOfs E | copyRef E t | copyRef v E
newRef-fi
Σ = (lcur, µfi, ...) lcur ⊑ l µ
′
fi = µfi [a 7→ Lb
TCB
l t ] Σ′ = (lcur, µ
′
fi, ...)
〈Σ|E [newReffi l t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ
′|E [return (RefTCBfi l a)]〉
fresh(a)
readRef-fi
Σ = (lcur, µfi, ...)
〈Σ|E [readReffi (Ref
TCB
fi l a)]〉 −→ 〈Σ|E [unlabel µfi (a)]〉
writeRef-fi
Σ = (lcur, µfi, ...) lcur ⊑ l µ
′
fi = µfi [a 7→ Lb
TCB
l t ] Σ′ = (lcur, µ
′
fi, ...)
〈Σ|E [writeReffi (Ref
TCB
fi l a) t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ
′|E [return ()]〉
labelOf-fi
E [labelOffi (Ref
TCB
fi l a)]) −→ E [l ]
copyRef
Σ = (lcur, µfi, ...) l1 ⊑ l2 lcur ⊑ l2
LbTCB l1 v1 = µfi (a1) µ
′
fi = µfi [a2 7→ Lb
TCB
l2 v1 ] Σ
′ = (lcur, µ
′
fi, ...)
〈Σ|E [copyRef (RefTCBfi l1 a1) (Ref
TCB
fi l2 a2)]〉 −→ 〈Σ
′|E [return ()]〉
Fig. 6: Extending λLIOℓ with references.
2.3 Labeled references
To complete the description of LIO, we extend the λLIOℓ calculus with mutable,
flow-insensitive references. Conceptually, flow-insensitive references are simply
mutable Labeled values. Like labeled values, the label of a reference is immutable
and serves to protect the underlying term. The immutable label makes the se-
mantics straightforward: writing a term to a reference amounts to ensuring that
the reference label is as restrictive as the current label, i.e., the reference label
must be above the current label; reading from a reference taints the current label
with the reference label.
The syntactic extensions to our calculus are shown in Figure 6. We use meta-
variable s to distinguish flow-insensitive (FI) and flow-sensitive (FS) productions—
the latter are described in Section 3. We also extend configurations to contain a
reference (memory) store µfi: Σ = (lcur, µfi, ...); µfi maps memory addresses—
spanned over by metavariable a—to Labeled values.
When creating a flow-insensitive reference, newReffi l t creates a labeled
value that guards t with label l (LbTCB l t) and stores it in the memory store at a
fresh address a (µfi [a 7→ Lb
TCB l t ]). Subsequently, the function returns a value
of the form Ref TCBfi l a which simply encapsulates the reference label and address
where the term is stored. We remark that since any references created within
a toLabeled block may outlive the toLabeled block computation, the merge
function used in rule (toLabeled) must also account for this, i.e., (lcur, µfi, ...)⋉
(l′cur, µ
′
fi, ...) = (lcur, µ
′
fi, ...).
Rule (readRef-fi) gives the semantics for reading a labeled reference; read-
ing the term stored at address a simply amounts to unlabeling the value µ (a)
stored at the underlying address (unlabel µfi (a)).
Terminal writeReffi is used to update the memory store with a new term.
Note that writeReffi leaves the label of the reference intact, i.e., the label of a
flow-insensitive reference is never changed, but, as rule (writeRef-fi) shows in
turn, requires the current label to be below the reference label when performing
the write (lcur ⊑ l).
Terminal labelOffi has the benefit of allowing code to always inspect the
label of a reference.
Terminal copyRef is to copy the contents of one reference to another, with-
out inspecting the contents of either reference. As given by rule (copyRef),
the function copies the contents of a labeled reference into another one, as long
as the source-reference label (l1) flows to the target-reference label (l2) and the
usual condition for writing to an entity with label l2 also holds (lcur ⊑ l2). Since
the computation does not read the source reference, the current label remains
unchanged. We remarks that while copyRef can be encoded using toLabeled,
we introduce copyRef explicitly since the use of toLabeled is prohibited in
concurrent settings and our results rely on such a feature in both contexts (see
Section 5),
3 Flow-sensitivity extensions
The flow-insensitive references described in the previous section are inflexible.
Consider, for example, an application that uses a reference as a log. Since the log
may contain sensitive information, it is important that the reference be labeled.
Equally important is to be able to read the log at any point in the program to, for
instance, save it to a file. Although labeling the reference with the top element
in the security lattice (⊤) would always allow writes to the log, and toLabeled
can be used to read the log and then write it to a file, this is unsatisfactory: it
assumes the existence of a top element, which in some practical IFC systems,
including HiStar [44] and Hails [14], does not exist. Moreover, it almost always
over-approximates the sensitivity of the log. Hence, for example, a computation
that never reads sensitive data, yet wishes to read the log content as to send error
message to a user over the network (e.g., as done in a web application) cannot
leakRef :: RefFS Bool → LIO Bool
leakRef href = do
tmp ← newRef L ()
toLabeled H $ do h ← readRef href
when h $writeRef tmp ()
return $ labelOf tmp ≡ H
Fig. 7: Attack on LIO with naive treatment of flow-sensitive references. We omit
subscripts for clarity.
do so—LIO prevents the computation from reading the log, which results in the
computation getting tainted by ⊤, and subsequently writing to the network.5 It
is clear that even for such a simple use case, having references with labels that
vary according to the sensitivity of what is stored in the reference is useful.
However, naively implementing flow-sensitive references can effectively intro-
duce label changes as a covert channel. Suppose that we allow for the label of
a reference to be raised to the current label at the time of the writeRef. So,
for example, if the label of our log reference is L and the computation has read
sensitive data (such that the current label is H), subsequently writing to the log
will raise the label of the reference to H. Unfortunately, while this may appear
safe, as previously shown in [2, 3, 31], the approach is unsound.
The code fragment in Figure 7 defines a function, leakRef , that can be used
to leak the contents of a reference by leveraging the newly introduced covert
channel: the label of references. (In this and future examples we use function
when to denote an if statement without the else branch and ($) as lightweight
notation for function application, i.e., f $x is the same as f (x ).) To illustrate an
attack, suppose that the current label is public (L) and leakRef is called with
a secret (H) reference (href ). leakRef first creates a public reference tmp and,
then, within the toLabeled block—which is used to ensure that the current
label remains L—the label of this reference is changed to H if the secret stored
in href is True, and left intact (L) if the secret is False. The value stored in href
is revealed by simply inspecting the label of the tmp reference.6
Fundamentally, the label protecting the label of an object, such as a reference
or labeled value, is the current label lcur at the time of creation. Hence, to modify
the label of the object within some context (e.g., toLabeled block) wherein the
current label is l′cur, it must be the case that l
′
cur ⊑ lcur, i.e., we must be able to
write data at sensitivity level l′cur into an entity—the label of the object—labeled
lcur. This restriction is especially important if lcur ⊏ l
′
cur and we can restore
the current label from l′cur to lcur, since a leak would then be observable within
the program itself. In the case where the label of the object is immutable, as is
the case for flow-insensitive references (and labeled values), this is not a concern:
5 Here, as in most IFC systems, we assume the network is public.
6 The use of labelOf is not fundamental to this attack and in Appendix B we show
an alternative attack that does not rely on such label inspection.
even if the current label is raised to l′cur and then restored to lcur, we do not
learn any information more sensitive than lcur—the label of the label at the time
of creation—by inspecting the label of the reference (or value): the label has not
changed!
Thus, to extend LIO with flow-sensitive references, we must account for the
label on the label of the reference at the time of creation, lcur. (This label is,
however, immutable.) In turn, when changing the label of the reference, we must
ensure that no data from the context at the time of the change, whose label is
l′cur, is leaked into the label of the reference by ensuring that l
′
cur ⊑ lcur, i.e.,
we can write data labeled l′cur into the label that is labeled lcur.
Formally, we extend the λLIOℓ syntax and reduction rules as shown in Figure 8;
we call this calculus λLIOℓ,fs. To create a flow-sensitive reference newReffs l t
creates a labeled value that guards t with label l (LbTCB l t). Since we wish to
allow programmers to modify the label l of the reference, we additionally store
the label on l , i.e., the current label lcur, by simply labeling the already-guarded
term (µ′fs = µfs [a 7→ Lb
TCB lcur (Lb
TCB l t)]), as shown in rule (newRef-fs).
Primitive newReffs returns a Ref
TCB
fs a which simply encapsulates the fresh
reference address where the doubly-labeled term is stored. Different from the
constructor Ref TCBfi , the constructor Ref
TCB
fs does not encapsulate the label of
the reference. This is precisely because the label of a flow-sensitive reference is
mutable and must be looked up in the store. As given by rule (labelOf-fs),
labelOffs returns the label of the reference after raising the current label (with
unlabel) to account for the fact that the label of the reference l ′ is a value at
sensitivity level l , i.e., we raise the current label to the join of the current label
and the label on the label.
The rule for reading flow-sensitive references is standard. As given by rule
(readREf-fs), readReffs simply raises the current label to the join of the
reference label and label on the reference label (l ⊔ l ′) and returns the protected
value. This reflects the fact that the computation is observing both data at level
l (the label on the reference) and l ′ (the actual term).
The rule for writing flow-sensitive references deserves more attention.
do r ← newReffs H ()
readReffs r
writeReffs r ()
Fig. 9: Permissiveness test.
First,writeReffs as given by rule (writeRef-
fs), ensures that the current computation can
write to the reference by checking that lcur ⊑
(l ⊔ l ′). We impose this condition instead of
the two conditions lcur ⊑ l and lcur ⊑ l
′—
which respectively check that the current com-
putation can modify both, the label of the
reference, and the reference itself—since it is
more permissive, yet still safe. When impos-
ing the two conditions independently, certain
programs, such as the one given in Figure 9,
would fail. In this program, we first create a flow-sensitive reference labeled H
when the current label is L (and thus the label on H is L). Then, we raise the
label by reading from the reference. Finally, we attempt to write to the reference.
v ::= · · · | RefTCBfs t
t ::= · · · | upgradefs t t | ⇑ | downgradefs t t
E ::= · · · | upgradefs E t | upgradefs v E
| downgradefs E t | downgradefs v E
newRef-fs
Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs) lcur ⊑ l
fresh(a) µ′fs = µfs [a 7→ Lb
TCB lcur (Lb
TCB
l t)] Σ′ = (lcur, µfi, µ
′
fs)
〈Σ|E [newReffs l t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ
′|E [return (RefTCBfs a)]〉
readRef-fs
Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs) µfs (a) = Lb
TCB
l (LbTCB l ′ t) l ′′ = l ⊔ l ′
〈Σ|E [readReffs (Ref
TCB
fs a)]〉 −→ 〈Σ|E [unlabel (Lb
TCB
l
′′
t)]〉
writeRef-fs
Σ = (lcur, µfi µfs) µfs (a) = Lb
TCB
l (LbTCB l ′ t ′)
lcur ⊑ (l ⊔ l
′) µ′fs = µfs [a 7→ Lb
TCB
l (LbTCB l ′ t)] Σ′ = (lcur, µfi, µ
′
fs)
〈Σ|E [writeReffs (Ref
TCB
fs a) t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ
′|E [return ()]〉
writeRef-fs-fail
Σ = (lcur, µfi µfs) µfs (a) = Lb
TCB
l (LbTCB l ′ t ′) lcur 6⊑ (l ⊔ l
′)
〈Σ|E [writeReffs (Ref
TCB
fs a) t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ
′|E [unlabel (LbTCB l ⇑)]〉
labelOf-fs
Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs) µfs (a) = Lb
TCB
l (LbTCB l ′ t)
〈Σ|E [labelOffs (Ref
TCB
fs a)]〉 −→ 〈Σ|E [unlabel (Lb
TCB
l l
′)]〉
upgradeRef
Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs) µfs (a) = Lb
TCB
l (LbTCB l ′′ v)
lcur ⊑ l µ
′
fs = µfs [a 7→ Lb
TCB
l (LbTCB (l ′′ ⊔ l ′) v)] Σ′ = (lcur, µfi, µ
′
fs)
〈Σ|E [upgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs a) l
′ ]〉 −→ 〈Σ′|E [return ()]〉
downgradeRef
Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs) µfs (a) = Lb
TCB
l (LbTCB l ′′ v) lcur ⊑ l
µ′fs = µfs [a 7→ Lb
TCB
l (LbTCB (l ⊔ (l ′′ ⊓ l ′)) ⇑)] Σ′ = (lcur, µfi, µ
′
fs)
〈Σ|E [downgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs a) l
′ ]〉 −→ 〈Σ′|E [return ()]〉
Fig. 8: λLIOℓ,fs: extension of λ
LIO
ℓ with flow-sensitive references.
Under our semantics, this program behaves as expected; however, when impos-
ing the two conditions independently, the write fails—the current label does not
flow to the label on the label of the reference.
Another case for writeReffs which we must handle is when current label
does not flow to the join of the reference label, i.e., lcur 6⊑ l ⊔ l
′, and the write
is disallowed. If the semantics simply got stuck, the current label (at the point of
the stuck term) would not reflect the fact that the success of applying such rule
depends on the label l ′, which is itself protected by l . Indeed, this might lead to
information leaks and we thus provide an explicit rule, (writeref-fs-fail), for
this failure case that first raises the current label (via unlabel) to l and then
diverges; in the rule, ⇑ represents a divergent term for which we do not provide
a reduction rule.
Note that writeReffs does not modify the label of the reference. This is,
in part, because we wish to keep the difference between flow-insensitive and
flow-sensitive references as small as possible. Instead, we provide upgradefs
precisely for this purpose; this primitive is used to raise the label of a reference.
Rule (upgradeRef) is straight forward—it simply ensures that the current
computation can modify the label of the reference by checking that the current
label flows to the label on the label (lcur ⊑ l). Similarly, downgradefs is used
to lower the label of the reference, destroying its contents, i.e., replacing its value
with ⇑. Rules (upgradeRef) and (downgradeRef) are analogous; the main
difference is that the former uses the join operation to combine the old and new
labels (l ′′ ⊔ l ′), whereas the latter uses the meet operation (l ′′ ⊓ l ′). The
downgradefs primitive is useful when one wishes to store information that is
less sensitive into a reference. Both upgradefs and downgradefs highlight that
it is safe to raise or lower the label of a flow-sensitive reference, if that the label
on the label still flows to the final label in the nested LbTCB structure.
3.1 Automatic upgrades
We can use λLIOℓ,fs to implement various applications that rely on flow-sensitive
references, even those that rely on policies such as the popular no-sensitive up-
grades [2]. Using λLIOℓ,fs, we can also safely implement our logging application
using a flow-sensitive reference. Unfortunately, our system (and others like it)
requires that we insert upgrades before we raise the current label so that it is
possible to write references in a more-sensitive context, e.g., to modify a public
reference after reading a secret. In the case of the logging example, we would
need to upgrade the label before reading any sensitive data, if we later wish to
write to the log.
We provide an extension to λLIOℓ,fs that can be used to automatically upgrade
references. This extension, called λLIOℓ,fs+au, is given in Figure 10. Intuitively, when-
ever the current label is about to be raised, we first upgrade all the references in
the µfs store and then raise the current label. Rule (upgradeStore) upgrades
every reference in the flow-sensitive store µfs by executing t1 >> t2 >> · · · >> tn ,
where ti = upgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs ai) l . Term t >> t
′ is similar to bind except that
it discards the result produced by t . Since unlabel is the only function that
upgradeStore
Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs)
µfs = {a1 7→ v1, ..., an 7→ vn } ti = upgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs ai) l , i = 1, ...,n
〈Σ|E [upgradeStorefs l ]〉 −→ 〈Σ|E [t1 >> ... >> tn ]〉
unlabel-au
Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs) l
′
cur = lcur ⊔ l
〈Σ|upgradeStorefs l
′
cur〉 −→
∗ 〈lcur, µfi, µ
′
fs|LIO
TCB ()〉 Σ′ = (l′cur, µfi, µ
′
fs)
〈Σ|E [unlabel (LbTCB l t)]〉 −→ 〈Σ′|E [return t ]〉
Fig. 10: λLIOℓ,fs+au: Extending λ
LIO
ℓ,fs with auto-upgrades.
raises the current label, we augment the (unlabel) rule with (unlabel-au),
given in Figure 10. This ensures that as the computation progresses it does
not “lose” write access to its references. Returning to our logging example, with
auto-upgrades the reference used as the log never needs to be explicitly upgraded
and can always be written to—an interface expected of a log.
Recall that toLabeled is used to avoid label creep by allowing code to only
temporarily raise the current label. Unfortunately, with auto-upgrades, when
the current label gets raised within a toLabeled block, the upgrades of the
flow-sensitive references remain even after the current label is restored. Thus,
reading from any flow-sensitive reference after the toLabeled block will raise
the current label to (at least) the current label at the end of the toLabeled
block (since all references are upgraded every time the current label gets raised).
This can be used to carry out a poison pill -like attack [18], wherein the (usually
untrusted) computation executing within the toLabeled block will render the
outer computation useless via label creep. (We note that this attack is possible
in λLIOℓ,fs without the auto-upgrade, but requires the attacker to manually insert
all the upgrades.)
To address this issue, we extend λLIOℓ,fs (and λ
LIO
ℓ,fs+au) with withRefsfs v t ,
which takes a bag (strict heterogeneous list) v of references and a computation
t , and executes t in a configuration where the flow-sensitive reference store only
contains the subset of references v (and any nested references). This extension
and type rule (Type-withRef), which ensures that a term cannot access a
reference outside its store, are shown in Figure 11.
A bag is either empty ǫ τ,..., or it may contain a set of references of (poten-
tially) distinct types v , . .. Rules (withRefs-Ctx) and (withRefs-Done) pre-
cisely define the semantics of this new primitive, where the meta-level function
addrs(·) converts a bag of references to a set of their corresponding addresses,
addrs−1(·) performs the inverse conversion, and ⋉ is used to merge the stores,
giving preferences to the left-hand-side store, i.e., when there is a discrepancy
on a stored value between both stores, it chooses the one appearing on the left-
hand-side. The function addrs+µ (·) computes the closure of addrs(·) under store
µ, so as to include the addresses of arbitrarily-nested references. Note that if we
did not include these addresses in the restricted store µ′fs, evaluation might get
v ::= · · · | v , ... | ǫ τ,...
t ::= · · · | t , ... | withRefsfs t t
τ ::= · · · | τ, ...
E ::= · · · | E, t , ... | v , E, t , ... | withRefsfs E t
addrs(ǫ τ,...) , ∅
addrs(RefTCBfs a1, Ref
TCB
fs a2, ...) , {a1, a2, ...}
addrs+µ (ǫ τ,...) , ∅
addrs+µ (v1, v2, ...) ,
⋃
{addrs+µ (v1), addrs
+
µ (v2), ...}
addrs+µ (Ref
TCB
fs a) , {a } ∪ addrs
+
µ (µ (a))
addrs+µ (v) , ∅
withRefs-Ctx
Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs) µ
′
fs = {a 7→ µfs (a) | a ∈ dom µfs ∩ (addrs
+
µfs (v))}
〈lcur, µfi, µ
′
fs|E [t ]〉 −→ 〈l
′
cur, µ
′
fi, µ
′′
fs|E [t
′ ]〉
Σ′′ = (l′cur, µ
′
fi, µ
′′
fs ⋉ µfs) v
′ = addrs−1(dom µ′′fs)
〈Σ|E [withRefsfs v t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ
′′|E [withRefsfs v
′
t
′ ]〉
withRefs-Done
〈Σ|E [withRefsfs v v
′ ]〉 −→ 〈Σ|E [v ′ ]〉
Type-withRef
∆′ = {a 7→ ∆ (a) | a ∈ dom ∆ ∩ (addrs(v))}
∆′, Γ ⊢ v :Reffs τ1, ... ∆
′, Γ ⊢ t : LIO τ
∆, Γ ⊢ withRefsfs v t : LIO τ
Fig. 11: Extending λLIOℓ,fs and λ
LIO
ℓ,fs+au with withRefsfs.
stuck if the program attempted a readReffs operation on a nested reference.
We note that (withRefs-Ctx) is triggered until the term under evaluation is
reduced to a value, at which point (withRefs-Done) is triggered, returning
said value; we specify this big-step rule in terms of small-steps to facilitate the
formalization of our concurrent calculus (see Section 4). Aside from the model-
ing of bags, the withRefsfs primitive is straightforward and mostly standard;
indeed, the programming paradigm is similar to that already present in some
mainstream languages (e.g., C++’s lambda closures require the programmer to
specify the captured references). Lastly, we note that the poison pill attack can
now be addressed by simply wrapping toLabeled with withRefsfs, which pre-
vents (untrusted) code within the toLabeled block from upgrading arbitrary
references.
4 Concurrency
In this section, we consider flow-sensitive references in the presence of concur-
rency (e.g., a web application in which request-handling threads share a common
log). Concretely, we extend our sequential λLIOℓ,fs and λ
LIO
ℓ,fs+au calculi with threads
and a new terminal, forkLIO, for dynamically creating new threads, as in the
concurrent version of LIO [36]. Intuitively, this concurrent calculus λ‖-LIOℓ simply
defines a scheduler over sequential threads, such that taking a step in the con-
current calculus amounts to taking a step in a sequential thread and context
switching to a different one. For brevity, we restrict our discussion in this sec-
tion to the case where the underlying sequential calculus is λLIOℓ,fs+au, since this
calculus extends λLIOℓ,fs.
t ::= · · · | forkLIO t | toLabeled t t
forkLIO
〈Σ|E [forkLIO t ]〉
fork(t)
−→ 〈Σ|E [return ()]〉
withRefs-Opt
v = addrs−1((addrs(v1)) ∩ (addrs(v2))) 〈Σ|E [withRefsfs v t ] −→ 〈Σ
′|E [t ′ ]〉〉
〈Σ|E [withRefsfs v1 (withRefsfs v2 t)]〉 −→ 〈Σ
′|E [t ′ ]〉
T-step
Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs)
〈Σ|withRefsfs v t〉 −→ 〈Σ
′|t ′〉 Σ′ = (l′cur, µ
′
fi, µ
′
fs) v
′ = addrs−1(dom µ′fs)
{µfi, µfs|〈lcur, v , t〉, k2, ...} −→ {µ
′
fi, µ
′
fs|k2, ..., 〈l
′
cur, v
′, t ′〉}
T-stuck
{µfi, µfs|〈lcur, v ,⇑〉, k2, ...} −→ {µfi, µfs|k2, ...}
T-done
{µfi, µfs|〈lcur, v , v
′〉, k2, ...} −→ {µfi, µfs|k2, ...}
T-fork
Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs) 〈Σ|withRefsfs v t〉
fork(t′)
−→ 〈Σ′|t ′′〉
Σ′ = (l′cur, µ
′
fi, µ
′
fs) v
′ = addrs−1(dom µ′fs) knew = 〈l
′
cur, v
′, t ′〉
{µfi, µfs|〈lcur, v , t〉, k2, ...} −→ {µ
′
fi, µ
′
fs|k2, ..., 〈l
′
cur, v
′, t ′′〉, knew}
Fig. 12: Semantics for λ‖-LIOℓ , parametric in the flow-sensitivity policy, i.e., with
and without auto-upgrade.
Figure 12 shows our extended concurrent calculus, λ‖-LIOℓ . A concurrent pro-
gram configuration has the form {µfi, µfs|k1, k2, ...}, where µfi and µfs are re-
spectively the flow-insensitive and flow-sensitive stores shared by all the threads
k1, k2, ... in the program. Since the memory stores are global, a thread k is sim-
ply a tuple encapsulating the current label of the thread lcur, the term under
evaluation t , and a bag of references v the thread may access, i.e., k = 〈lcur, v , t〉.
The reduction rules for concurrent programs are mostly standard. Rule (T-
step) specifies that if the first thread in the thread pool takes a step in λLIOℓ,fs+au,
the whole concurrent program takes a step, moving the thread to the end of the
pool. We note that the thread term t executed with its stored current label lcur,
and a subset of the flow-sensitive memory store, by wrapping it in withRefsfs.
While the use of withRefsfs makes the extension straightforward, one peculiar-
ity arises: since (T-step) always wraps the thread term t with withRefsfs, if t
does not reduce in one step to a value, and instead reduces to a term t ′, the next
time the thread is scheduled, we will superfluously wrap withRefsfs t
′ with
yet another withRefsfs—thus preventing the thread from making progress! To
address this problem, we extend the calculus with rule (withRefs-Opt) that
collapses nested withRefsfs blocks.
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Rules (T-done) and (T-stuck) specify that once a thread term has reduced
to a value or got stuck, which is represented by ⇑, the scheduler removes it from
the thread pool and schedules the next thread.
As shown in Figure 12, to allow for dynamic thread creation, we extend
λLIOℓ,fs+au’s terms with forkLIO, and add a new reduction rule that sends an
event to the scheduler, specifying the term to execute in a new thread.8 Rule
(T-fork) describes the corresponding scheduler rule, triggered when a fork (t ′)
event is received. Here, we create a new thread knew whose current label l
′
cur and
partition of the store, i.e., bag of references v ′, is the same as that of the parent
thread; the term evaluated in the newly created thread is provided in the event:
t ′. Subsequently, we add the new thread to the thread pool.
The final modification in extending λLIOℓ,fs+au to λ
‖-LIO
ℓ is the removal of toLabeled
from the underlying calculus. As described in [36], we must remove toLabeled to
guarantee termination-sensitive non-interference. Importantly, however, forkLIO
with synchronization primitives (e.g., flow-insensitive labeled MVars, as dis-
cussed in [36]) can be used to provide functionality equivalent to that of toLabeled.
Due to space constraints we omit synchronization primitives from λ‖-LIOℓ ; we only
remark that extending λ‖-LIOℓ to provide flow-sensitive labeled MVars follows in a
straightforward way.
Since the flow-sensitive attack in Figure 7 relied on toLabeled to restore the
current label, a natural question, given that we remove toLabeled, is whether
we can use the naive flow-sensitive reference semantics of Section 3 for concur-
rent LIO. As shown by the attack code in Figure 13, in which we use forkLIO
instead of toLabeled to address a potential label creep, the fundamental prob-
lem remains: the label on the reference label is not protected! This precisely
motivated our principled approach of extending λLIOℓ,fs+au to a concurrent setting
as opposed to extending concurrent LIO with flow-sensitive references.
7 This change also requires modifying (withRefs-Ctx) to not be triggered when the
term being evaluated is a withRefsfs term.
8 In fact, the reduction rule for λLIOℓ,fs+au must be changed to account for events.
However, since fork is the only event in our system, we treat −→ as implicitly
carrying an empty event.
leakRef :: RefTCB Bool → LIO Bool
leakRef href = do
tmp ← newRef L ()
forkLIO $ do h ← readRef href
when h $writeRef tmp ()
delay
return $ labelOf tmp ≡ H
Fig. 13: Attack on concurrent LIO with naive flow-sensitive reference extension.
5 Formal results
In this section, we show that our flow-sensitive enforcement can be embedded into
the flow-insensitive version of LIO. Additionally, we provide security guarantees
in terms of non-interference definitions by reusing previous results on LIO.
5.1 Embedding into λLIOℓ
Every flow-sensitive reference with label ld created in a context where the current
label is lo (and thus stored in µfs as Lb
TCB lo (Lb
TCB ld t)), can be represented
by a flow-insensitive reference with label lo , whose contents are another flow-
insensitive reference containing t and labeled ld .
Figure 14 gives our encoding of the flow-sensitive reference operations in
terms of flow-insensitive references. For a given store Σ, we define the J−KΣfi
function, which given a term t in λLIOℓ,fs, produces a term JtK
Σ
fi in λ
LIO
ℓ , expanding
the definitions of flow-sensitive operations in terms of flow-insensitive ones. This
function is applied homomorphically in all other cases. We use theWrapRef con-
structor to mark the flow-insensitive references that are being used to represent
flow-sensitive ones, so as to distinguish them from other flow-insensitive refer-
ences. The functions wrap and unwrap are used to add and remove this bound-
ary encoding. In the embedding of writeReffs, we use toLabeled to make any
changes to the current label (possibly caused by reading the outer reference)
local to this operation. Inside toLabeled, the code fetches the inner reference
(readReffi), and then performs the actual write of the new value. If this fails,
the computation diverges, but, importantly, the current label was raised (with
readReffi) to reflect the fact that the label on the label of the reference was
observed. The embedding of upgradefs relies on flow-insensitive primitives to
implement the upgrade operation. As inwriteReffs, a toLabeled block is used
to delimit the taint on the current label. Inside the block, the code fetches the
inner reference (readReffi), which taints the current label with l
′, and makes a
new reference n (newReffi) with the upgraded label (lcur ⊔ (l ⊔ labelOf i))
and an undefined value (⊥). Observe that the operation for creating the refer-
ence always succeeds since its label is above the current label, i.e., lcur. Then,
copyRef is used to copy the value of the original inner reference into the new
one, n. As before, this action always succeeds because the label of the reference
bound to i (labelOf i) is below the label of the new reference n. Finally, the
reference n is stored in place of the original inner reference using writeRef·.
Importantly, this instruction only succeeds when the current label at the time of
writing, i.e., lc ⊔ l ′ in Figure 14, is below or equal to l ′ (the label of the outer
reference), i.e., lc ⊔ l ′ ⊑ l ′. This restrictions holds when the current label
at the time of upgrade, i.e., lc, is below or equal to l ′—effectively encoding the
non-sensitive upgrade policy for label changes. The embedding of downgradefs
follows similarly, except that the label of the new reference is computed using ⊓
instead of ⊔ (to achieve the downgrade), and the copyRef step is omitted, since
the original value must be destroyed. We remark that that the mapping mimics
the behavior described by the rules in Figure 8.
We extend this definition naturally to convert λLIOℓ,fs environments into λ
LIO
ℓ
environments, by having J(lcur, µfi, µfs)Kfi , (lcur, µ
′
fi) where µ
′
fi is obtained by
extending µfi with the pair of bindings ai 7→ Lb
TCB lo (Ref
TCB
fi ld bi), bi 7→
(LbTCB ld v) (with bi being a fresh name) for each binding of the form ai 7→
LbTCB lo (Lb
TCB ld vi) in µfs. Note that the domains of µfi and µfs are disjoint
because the fresh(·) predicate that we use in the semantics is assumed to produce
globally unique addresses.
In order to prove that our implementation is correct with respect to the
semantics, we show that, if we take a program with flow-sensitive operations,
and expand those operations, replacing them by the code in Figure 14, then its
behavior corresponds with the flow-sensitive semantics.
Theorem 1 (Embedding λLIOℓ,fs in λ
LIO
ℓ ). Let t be a well-typed term in λ
LIO
ℓ,fs.
Then if 〈Σ|t〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′|v〉, we have 〈JΣKfi|JtK
Σ
fi 〉 −→
∗ 〈JΣ′Kfi|JvK
Σ
fi 〉, and if
〈Σ|t〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′|⇑〉, then 〈JΣKfi|JtK
Σ
fi 〉 −→
∗ 〈JΣ′Kfi|⇑〉.
Proof. See Appendix C.
While straight forward, this theorem highlights an important result: in floating
label systems, flow-sensitive references can be encoded in a calculus with flow-
insensitive references and explicitly labeled values.
5.2 Security guarantees for λLIOℓ,fs, λ
LIO
ℓ,fs+au and λ
‖-LIO
ℓ
From previous results [35], we know that LIO satisfies termination-insensitive
non-interference (TINI) in the sequential setting, and termination-sensitive non-
interference (TSNI) in the concurrent setting. By using the embedding theorem
we can extend these results for LIO with flow-sensitive references.
For completeness, we now present our non-interference theorems, as straight-
forward applications of the theorems in previous work. Our security results rely
on the notion of l -equivalence for terms and configurations, which captures the
idea of terms that cannot be distinguished by an attacker which can observe data
at level l . A pair of terms t1, t2 is said to be l -equivalent (written t1 ≈l t2) if,
wrap r ,WrapRef r
unwrap (WrapRef r) , r
JRefTCBfs rK
(lcur,µfi,µfs)
fi , wrap (Ref
TCB
fi (labelOffi µfs (r)) r)
JnewReffsK
Σ
fi , λl t .do
i ← newReffi l t
lcur ← getLabel
o ← newReffi lcur i
return (wrap o)
JreadReffsK
Σ
fi , λr .readReffi (unwrap r) >>= readReffi
JwriteReffsK
Σ
fi , λr t .let o = unwrap r in do
lcur ← getLabel
toLabeled (lcur ⊔ (labelOf o)) $ do
i ← readReffi o
writeReffi i t
JlabelOffsK
Σ
fi , λr .
readReffi (unwrap r)>>= return.labelOffi
JupgradefsK
Σ
fi , λr l .let o = unwrap r
l ′ = labelOf o in do
lc ← getLabel
toLabeled (lc ⊔ l ′) $ do
i ← readReffi o
lcur ← getLabel
n ← newReffi (lcur ⊔ (l ⊔ labelOf i)) ⊥
copyRef i n
writeReffi o n
JdowngradefsK
Σ
fi , λr l .let o = unwrap r
l ′ = labelOf o in do
lc ← getLabel
toLabeled (lc ⊔ l ′) $ do
i ← readReffi o
lcur ← getLabel
n ← newReffi (lcur ⊔ (l ⊓ labelOf i)) ⊥
writeReffi o n
JwithRefsfs v tK
(lcur,µfi,µfs)
fi , JtK
(lcur,µfi,µ
′
fs
)
fi
where
µ′fs = {a 7→ µfs (a) | a ∈ dom µfs ∩ (addrs
+
µfs (v))}
Fig. 14: Implementation mapping for flow-sensitive references. For all other
terms, the function is applied homomorphically.
after erasing all the information more sensitive than l from t1 and t2, we obtain
syntactically equivalent terms. This definition extends naturally to configura-
tions.
Intuitively, non-interference means that an attacker at level l cannot distin-
guish among different runs of a program with l -equivalent initial configurations.
Theorem 2 (TINI for λLIOℓ,fs). Consider two well-typed terms t1 and t2 in λ
LIO
ℓ,fs
which do not contain any · TCB syntax nodes, such that t1 ≈l t2, where l is the
attacker observation level. Let Σ be an initial environment, and let
〈Σ|t1〉 −→
∗ 〈Σ1|v1〉 and 〈Σ|t2〉 −→
∗ 〈Σ2|v2〉
Then, we have that 〈Σ1|v1〉 ≈l 〈Σ2|v2〉.
Proof. By expanding all the flow-sensitive operations in t1 and t2 using their defi-
nition given in Figure 14, we get terms in λLIOℓ , which by Theorem 1 has equivalent
semantics. Therefore, the result follows from the λLIOℓ TINI result of [35].
Corollary 1 (TINI for λLIOℓ,fs+au). The previous non-interference result can be
easily extended to λLIOℓ,fs+au. In λ
LIO
ℓ,fs+au, the unlabel operation triggers the au-
tomatic upgrades mechanism, which performs the upgrade operation for every
flow-sensitive reference in scope before actually raising the current label. Regard-
less of how unlabel is used, we note that the resulting term (after inserting the
necessary upgrades), is just an λLIOℓ,fs term. Therefore, the main TINI result for
λLIOℓ,fs applies.
For the concurrent result, we need a supporting lemma which states that
the current label is always at least as sensitive as the label of every reference in
scope. Formally,
Lemma 1. Let t be a well-typed term in λ‖-LIOℓ , Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs) be an initial
environment, and a be the address of a flow-sensitive reference r in Σ, where
µfs (a) = Lb
TCB lo (Lb
TCB ld v). Then, if 〈Σ|t〉 −→
∗ 〈l′cur, µ
′
fi, µ
′
fs|t
′〉, we have
that lo ⊑ l
′
cur.
Proof. Note that the result holds immediately after creating r , since the current
label is the label on the label of r , i.e., lo = lcur. It is easy to show that lo is
immutable, since there are no reduction rules that modify it. Moreover, given
that the current label is monotonic, the only way in which lo ⊑ lcur can cease
to hold is if r is accessed from a different thread. But in order to pass r to a
different thread, a labeled object must be used as intermediary, and the label of
such object would have to be at least lcur, the current label in the thread that
created r . As a result, if we were to pass r to another thread in this way, then
the target thread would also have to be tainted by lcur, and the result would still
hold.
We now prove our non-interference theorem for λ‖-LIOℓ . This result is stronger
than TINI, since it implies that there can be no termination or internal timing
leaks.
Theorem 3 (TSNI for λ‖-LIOℓ ). Consider two well-typed terms t1 and t2 in λ
‖-LIO
ℓ
which do not contain any · TCB syntax nodes, such that t1 ≈l t2, where l is the
attacker observation level. Let Σ = (lcur, µfi, µfs) be an initial environment, and
let
{µfi, µfs|〈lcur, addrs
−1(dom µfs), t1〉} −→
∗ M1
Then, there exists some configuration M2 such that
{µfi, µfs|〈lcur, addrs
−1(dom µfs), t2〉} −→
∗ M2
and M1 ≈l M2.
Proof. From Lemma 1 and looking at the embeddings ofwriteReffs and upgradefs,
we note that the first readReffi operation in each toLabeled block will be try-
ing to raise the current label to l . However, since l ⊑ lcur, these operations will
never effectively raise the current label. This means that using toLabeled is
not necessary to preserve the semantics, because there is no need to restore the
current label afterwards. As a result, and after removing toLabeled in these two
cases, we note that the embedding produces valid concurrent λLIOℓ terms (which
does not have toLabeled).
Finally, by expanding all the flow-sensitive operations in t1 and t2 using
their definition given in Figure 14, we get terms in concurrent λLIOℓ . Therefore,
the result follows from the termination-sensitive non-interference of concurrent
λLIOℓ [36].
The detailed proofs for the results in this section can be found in Appendix C.
We lastly remark a limitation: while we preserve non-interference when embed-
ding the flow-sensitive calculus in the original LIO, our embedding includes no
synchronization to ensure atomicity of the flow-sensitive operations, so certain
interleaving that break semantic equivalence are possible.
5.3 Permissiveness
In Section 7 we compare the permissiveness of our system with previous flow-
sensitive IFC systems. Here, we solely remark that the above results imply that
our flow-sensitive calculus is as permissive as flow-insensitive LIO. In particular,
any flow-insensitive LIO program can be trivially converted to a flow-sensitive
LIO program (without auto-upgrades) by using flow-sensitive references instead
of flow-insensitive ones. Since these references would never be upgraded, they will
behave just like their flow-insensitive counterparts. This means that all existing
LIO programs can be run in our flow-sensitive monitor. This includes Hails [14],
a web framework using LIO, on top of which a number of applications have
been built (e.g., GitStar9, a code-hosting web platform, LearnByHacking10, a
blog/tutorial platform similar to School of Haskell, and LambdaChair [38], an
EasyChair-like conference review system).
9
www.gitstar.com
10 www.learnbyhacking.org
6 Comparison with other policies for label change
In this section, we compare our enforcement mechanism with two policies for
label change: no-sensitive-upgrade (originally proposed by Zdancewic [43]) and
permissive-upgrade, a more permissive version of the former by Austin and Flana-
gan [2, 3]. We introduce a simple imperative language to simplify our compar-
ison with the languages implementing the aforementioned policies. This sim-
ple language has variables, if -statements, a skip command that does nothing,
and an output command that is used to produce public outputs. This lan-
guage is easily implemented in λLIOℓ,fs as syntactic sugar. For example, a con-
ditional statement if C ;A else B is desugared to toLabeled H (do b ←
unlabel C ; if b then A else B). (Here, toLabeled is used to ensure that the
current label is restored after leaving the if-statement.)
6.1 No-sensitive-upgrade
The no-sensitive-upgrade discipline stops execution on any attempt to change
the label of a public variable inside a secret context. Our λLIOℓ,fs calculus essen-
tially implements this discipline as well—see (upgradeRef) in Figure 8. The
original presentation of no-sensitive-upgrade allows for variables with a secret
label to be downgraded, as long as the original contents are discarded. Our λLIOℓ,fs
calculus similarly allows for this with the downgrade operation. Our approach
differs in also allowing code to explicitly upgrade a variable before entering a se-
cret context, permissively allowing writes to originally-public variables in secret
contexts.
6.2 Permissive-upgrade
The permissive-upgrade policy differs from no-sensitive-upgrade in allowing code
to change the label of a public variables in secret contexts, but subsequently dis-
allowing branches on such permissively-upgraded, or “marked,” variables. When
upgrading a public variable in a secret context, the security label of the variable
is changed to P where L ⊑ H ⊑ P.
upgrade x H
if h
x := True
if x
skip
Fig. 15: A secure program
that λLIOℓ,fs accepts.
In general, the permissiveness of our approach
is incomparable with that of permissive-upgrade.
For example, without the upgrade operation, λLIOℓ,fs
is as expressive as no-sensitive-upgrade, and thus
less permissive than permissive-upgrade. But, with
upgrade we can write programs in λLIOℓ,fs that would
be rejected by a permissive-upgrade monitor. Fig-
ure 15 shows an example of one such case. In the
example, the upgrade operation is used to en-
sure that reference x , which would be marked P
by permissive-upgrade, ends up as H in all runs;
without the upgrade, a permissive-upgrade mon-
itor would reject the branch on x . By inserting
upgrade operations in the “right” places, our approach can become more flex-
ible than permissive-upgrade.
if h
x := True
if x
skip
Fig. 16: A secure program
that permissive-upgrade
rejects and λLIOℓ,fs+au
accepts.
Of course, the challenge lies in upgrading refer-
ences in a permissive fashion. And automatically
upgrading references whenever the current label
is raised is not necessarily more permissive than
a permissive-upgrade monitor. Indeed, the permis-
siveness of permissive-upgrade and λLIOℓ,fs+au are also
incomparable.
Figure 16 shows a program that is rejected by
permissive-upgrade but accepted by λLIOℓ,fs+au. With
permissive-upgrade, the first branch on h upgrades
x to P, which leads to a failure when subsequently
trying to branch x . With λLIOℓ,fs+au, on the other
hand, reference x would be upgraded to H, permissively allowing the second
branch.
Conversely, Figure 17 shows a secure program that is accepted by permissive-
upgrade but rejected by λLIOℓ,fs+au. In this program, there are two variables in
scope: x and y, both initially public. In the first secret conditional block we assign
to y, which with permissive-upgrade only upgrades variable y to P; x remains
L and thus the second branch is executed, producing a public output. With
λLIOℓ,fs+au, however, unlabeling h (an operation implicit in the first conditional,
which inspects h) auto-upgrades both x and y to H. As a result, the current
label at the point of the output is H, causing a failure.
One way to address the permissiveness issues of λLIOℓ,fs+au is by usingwithRefsfs
to delimit the scope of the upgrades. Figure 18 shows a modified version of the
previous example, where y is explicitly marked as the only variable that should
be upgraded in the first branch. As a consequence, x does not get upgraded and
the program does not fail—the output operation is allowed. More generally, if
there is enough static information to guide the use of withRefsfs, we believe
that λLIOℓ,fs+au could match (or exceed) the permissiveness of permissive-upgrade.
x , y := True
if h
y := False
if x
output (1)
Fig. 17: A secure program that
permissive-upgrade accepts and λLIOℓ,fs+au
rejects.
x , y := False
withRefsfs (y) {
if h
y := True
}
if x
output (1)
Fig. 18: A secure program that
permissive-upgrade and λLIOℓ,fs+au with
withRefsfs accept.
7 Related work
The label on the label could be seen as a fixed label that dictates which principals
can read or modify the policy (inner label) of a flow-sensitive entity. In a different
setting, trust management frameworks have explored this idea [4], where role-
based rules are labeled to restrict the view on policies—the mere presence of
certain policies could become inappropriate conduits of information.
Several authors propose an existence security label to remove leaks due to the
termination covert channel [29, 30] or certain behaviors in dynamic nested data
structures [16, 32]. While the existence security label and the label on the label
are structurally isomorphic, they are used for different purposes and in different
scenarios, e.g., inspecting labels is not allowed in [16, 29, 30, 32].
Hunt and Sands [19] show the equivalence (modulo code transformation) be-
tween flow-sensitive and flow-insensitive type-systems. Russo and Sabelfeld [31]
formally pin down the challenge of mutable labels when using purely dynamic
monitors. They prove that monitors require static analysis in order to be more
permissive than traditional flow-sensitive type-systems. Austin and Flanagan
propose a privatization operation to boost the permissiveness of permissive-
upgrade. This technique has been recently generalized to arbitrary lattices [5].
Moreover, the privatization operation can only enforce non-interference when
outputs are suppressed after branching on a marked flow-sensitive reference.
Unfortunately, none of the mentioned work consider flow-sensitive in the pres-
ence of concurrency. In fact, the notion of permissive-upgrade does not easily
generalize to the concurrent setting, as this would require tracking occurrences
of branches across threads.
Recently, Hritcu et al. [18] propose a floating-label system called Breeze.
Like LIO, Breeze allows changes in the current context label (i.e., pc) and only
considered values with flow-insensitive labels. Given the design similarities with
LIO [35], we believe that our results could be easily adapted to Breeze.
Hedin et al. [17] recently developed JSFlow, an IFC flow-sensitive monitor
for JavaScript. The monitor uses the no-sensitive-upgrade label changing policy.
To overcome some of the restrictions imposed by this discipline, the primitive
upgrade is introduced to explicitly change labels. Our upgrade operation re-
sembles that proposed by Hedin et al. Moreover, the extension to unlabel as
described Section 3 can be seen as an automatic application of upgrade ev-
ery time that the current label gets raised. Using testing, Birgisson et al. [6]
automatically insert upgrade instructions to boost the permissiveness of no-
sensitive-upgrade. We further extend this concept of (automatic) upgrades to
a concurrent setting.
The Operating System IFC community has also treated the mutable label
problem in the presence of purely dynamic monitors. Specifically, IFC OSes
such as Asbestos [10], HiStar [44], and Flume [21] distinguish between subjects
(processes), and objects (files, sockets, etc.) such that the security labels for
objects are immutable, while subject labels change according to the sensitivity
of data being read. As in language-based IFC systems, changing the label of
subjects and object can become a covert channel, if not handled appropriated.
Hence, HiStar and Flume require that the label of a subject be done explicitly
by the subject code. Asbestos, on the other hand, allowed (unsafe) changes to
labels as the result of receiving messages under specific and safe conditions. Our
work extends these concepts with a level of indirection to allow for changes in
object labels.
Coarse-grained IFC enforcements, similar to the ones found in IFC OS work,
have been applied to web browsers. e.g, BFlow [42] and COWL [39] track the
flow of information at the granularity of protection zones and context, respec-
tively. Both can be understood as tracking IFC at the iframe-level granularity.
As in LIO, an iframe’s label, i.e., a subject’s label, must be explicitly updated.
While our techniques can be applied to COWL, BFlow does not have fine-grained
labeled objects; hence the flow-sensitivity result is only applicable at the pro-
tection zone level. By taking a more fine grained approach, the DOM-tree could
be thought of as being composed of flow-sensitive objects, whose security labels
change according to the dynamic behavior of the web page, as done in [32].
Hoare-like logics for IFC are often flow-sensitive [e.g. 1, 28]. Different from
dynamic approaches, these logics have the ability to observe all the execution
paths and safely approximate label changes. As a result, no leaks due to la-
bel changes are present in provably secure programs. Le Guernic et al. [22, 23]
combine dynamic and static checks in a flow-sensitive execution monitor. For a
flow-sensitive type-system, Foster et al. [13] propose a restrict primitive that
limits the use of variables’ aliases in a block of code. Our withRefsfs is similar
to restrict in being used to increase the permissiveness of the analysis.
8 Conclusions
We presented an extension of LIO with flow-sensitive references. As in previous
flow-sensitive work, our approach allows secure label changes using upgrade and
downgrade operations, as a way to boost the permissiveness of the IFC sys-
tem, i.e., upgrade can be used to allow for the encoding of programs that would
otherwise be rejected by the IFC monitor. Since manually inserting upgrade
operations can be cumbersome, we extend the calculus to automatically insert
upgrades whenever the current label is raised, while still giving programmers fine-
grained control over which references untrusted code can upgrade. Importantly,
our approach extends to a concurrent setting. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work to address the problem of flow-sensitive label changes for a con-
current, dynamic IFC language. A further insight of this work was to show that,
by leveraging nested labeled objects, both the sequential and concurrent calculi
with flow-sensitive references can be encoded using only flow-insensitive con-
structs. As a consequence, our soundness proof can be reduced to an invocation
of previous results for LIO.
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A Semantics for the base calculus
The reduction rules for pure and monadic terms are given in Figure 19. We
define substitution {t2 / x } t1 in the usual way: homomorphic on all operators
and renaming bound names to avoid captures. Our label operations ⊔, ⊓, and
⊑ rely on the label-specific implementation of these lattice operators, as used
in the premise of rule (labelOp); we use the meta-level partial function J·Kℓ,
which maps terms to values, to precisely capture this implementation detail.
The reduction rules for pure terms are standard. For instance, in rule (ifTrue),
when the branch has a true condition, i.e., E [if True then t2 else t3 ], it reduces
to the then branch (E [t2 ]). The rest are self-explanatory and we do not discuss
them any further.
Since all the IFC checks are performed by individual LIO terms, the definition
for return and (>>=) are trivial. The former simply reduces to a monadic value
by wrapping the term with the LIOTCB constructor, while the latter evaluates
the left-hand term and supplies the result to the right-hand term, as usual.
B Attack on naive flow-sensitive references
leakRef :: RefFS Bool → LIO Bool
leakRef href = do
lref ← newRef L True
tmp ← newRef L False
toLabeled H $ do h ← readRef href
when h $writeRef tmp True
toLabeled H $ do t ← readRef tmp
when (¬ t) $writeRef lref False
readRef lref
Fig. 20: An attack in LIO with naive flow-sensitive reference extension without
labelOf.
As in the attack of Figure 7, the leakRef of Figure 20 can be used to leak the
value stored in a H reference href , while keeping the current label L, without
using labelOf. Internally, the value is leaked into public reference lref by lever-
aging the fact that, based on a secret value, the label of a public reference (tmp)
can be changed (or not). In the first toLabeled block, if h ≡ True, then the
label of tmp is raised to H and its value is set to True. In the second toLabeled
block, we read tmp, which may raise the current label to H if the secret is True
(and thus tmp was upgraded). Indeed, if the secret is True (and thus t ≡ True)
we leave the public reference intact: True. However, if the secret is False, the
tmp reference is not modified in the first toLabeled block and thus when read-
ing it in the second toLabeled block, the current label remains L, and since
t ≡ False, we write False into the public reference. In both cases the value stored
in lref corresponds to that of href , yet leaving the current label and the label of
lref intact (L).
C Embedding Theorem
In this section we prove that the embedding from λLIOℓ,fs into λ
LIO
ℓ preserves seman-
tics.
We will use the following lemma for single λLIOℓ,fs steps:
Lemma 2 (Single-step embedding). Let t be a well-typed term in λLIOℓ,fs. Then
if 〈Σ|t〉 −→ 〈Σ′|t ′〉, then there is a configuration Y such that 〈JΣKfi|JtK
Σ
fi 〉 −→
∗
Y and 〈JΣ′Kfi|Jt
′KΣfi 〉 −→
∗ Y , i.e. 〈JΣKfi|JtK
Σ
fi 〉 and 〈JΣ
′Kfi|Jt
′KΣfi 〉 are β-equivalent.
Proof. Case analysis on the next redex in t . Most cases show a stronger version
of the lemma, i.e. that 〈Σ|t〉 −→ 〈Σ′|t ′〉 implies 〈JΣKfi|JtK
Σ
fi 〉 −→
∗ 〈JΣ′Kfi|Jt
′KΣfi 〉.
Case E [newReffs l t ].
We have 〈Σ|E [newReffs l t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ
′|E [return (Ref TCBfs a)]〉, where
Σ′ = Σ [µfs 7→ Σ.µfs [a 7→ Lb
TCB Σ.lcur (Lb
TCB l t)]], and we know that
Σ.lcur ⊑ l .
Let Σ1 = JΣKfi. We argue
〈Σ1|JE [newReffs l t ]K
Σ
fi 〉
−→ 〈Σ′1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [do lcur ← getLabel; return (wrap (Ref
TCB
fi lcur a))]〉
(Σ′1 = Σ1 [µfi 7→ Σ1.µfi [i 7→ Lb
TCB l t ] ])
−→ 〈Σ′′1 |(JEK
Σ
fi ) [return (wrap (Ref
TCB
fi lcur a))]〉
(Σ′′1 = Σ1 [µfi 7→ Σ1.µfi [i 7→ Lb
TCB l t ;
a 7→ LbTCB lcur (Ref
TCB
fi l i)]])
We now have to check that Jreturn (Ref TCBfs a)K
Σ′
fi = return (wrap (Ref
TCB
fi lcur a))
and JΣ′Kfi = Σ
′′
1 , which follow directly from the definition of J·Kfi for references
and states.
Case E [readReffs (Ref
TCB
fs a)].
We have 〈Σ|E [readReffs (Ref
TCB
fs a)]〉 −→ 〈Σ|E [unlabel (Lb
TCB (l ⊔
l ′) t)]〉, where Σ.µfs (a) = Lb
TCB l (LbTCB l ′ t).
Let Σ1 = JΣKfi. We argue
〈Σ1|JE [readReffs (Ref
TCB
fs a)]K
Σ
fi 〉
−→ 〈Σ1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [readReffi (JRef
TCB
fs aK
·
fi)>>= readReffi ]〉
−→ 〈Σ1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [unlabel (Σ1.µfi (a)) >>= readReffi ]〉
−→ 〈Σ′1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [return (Ref
TCB
fi l
′ i) >>= readReffi ]〉
(Σ′1 = Σ1 [lcur 7→ Σ1.lcur ⊔ l ])
−→ 〈Σ′1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [readReffi (Ref
TCB
fi l
′ i)]〉
−→ 〈Σ′1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [unlabel (Σ
′
1.µfi (i))]〉
−→ 〈Σ′′1 |(JEK
Σ
fi ) [return t ]〉
(Σ′′1 = Σ
′
1 [lcur 7→ Σ
′
1.lcur ⊔ l
′ ])
Now if we consider 〈JΣKfi|JE [unlabel (Lb
TCB (l ⊔ l ′) t)]K·fi〉, we have
〈JΣKfi|JE [unlabel (Lb
TCB (l ⊔ l ′) t)]K·fi〉
−→ 〈Σ2|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [return t ]
(Σ2 = Σ2 [lcur 7→ (JΣKfi).lcur ⊔ l ⊔ l
′ ])〉
Note that Σ′′1 .lcur = (JΣKfi).lcur ⊔ l ⊔ l
′ = Σ2.lcur.
Case E [writeReffs (Ref
TCB
fs a) t ].
We have 〈Σ|E [writeReffs (Ref
TCB
fs a) t ]〉 −→ 〈Σ
′|E [return ()]〉, where
Σ.µfs (a) = Lb
TCB l (LbTCB l ′ v),Σ′ = Σ [µfs 7→ Σ.µfs [a 7→ Lb
TCB l (LbTCB l ′ v)]],
and we know that Σ.lcur ⊑ l ⊔ l
′.
Let Σ1 = JΣKfi. Then there exists a function µ such that:
〈Σ1|JE [upgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs a) l
′ ]KΣfi 〉
−→ 〈Σ1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [toLabeled (Σ1.lcur ⊔ l) (µ Σ1.lcur)]〉
We now step through the evaluation of 〈Σ1|µ Σ1.lcur〉, as follows:
〈Σ1|µ Σ1.lcur〉
−→ 〈Σ1| do i ← readRefJRefTCBfs aK·fi ;writeReffi i t〉
−→ 〈Σ′1|writeReffi i t〉
(Σ′1 = Σ1 [lcur 7→ Σ1.lcur ⊔ l ])
−→ 〈Σ′′1 |return ()〉
(Σ′′1 = Σ
′
1 [µfi 7→ Σ
′
1.µfi [i 7→ Lb
TCB l ′ t ] ])
Finally, this allows us to conclude (from the rule for toLabeled), that
〈Σ1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [toLabeled (Σ1.lcur ⊔ l) (µ Σ1.lcur)]〉
−→ 〈Σ2|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [return ()]〉
where Σ2 = (Σ1.lcur, Σ
′′
1 .µfi). Now we can check that JΣ
′Kfi = Σ2 from the
definition of J·Kfi for states.
Case E [upgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs a) l
′ ].
We have 〈Σ|E [upgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs a) l
′ ]〉 −→ 〈Σ′|E [return ()]〉, where
Σ.µfs (a) = Lb
TCB l (LbTCB l ′′ v),Σ′ = Σ [µfs 7→ Σ.µfs [a 7→ Lb
TCB l (LbTCB (l ⊔
l ′′ ⊔ l ′) v)]], and we know that Σ.lcur ⊑ l .
Let Σ1 = JΣKfi. Then there exists a function µ such that:
〈Σ1|JE [upgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs a) l
′ ]KΣfi 〉
−→ 〈Σ1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [toLabeled (Σ1.lcur ⊔ l) (µ Σ1.lcur)]〉
We now step through the evaluation of 〈Σ1|µ Σ1.lcur〉, as follows:
〈Σ1|µ Σ1.lcur〉
−→ 〈Σ1| do i ← readRefJRefTCB
fs
aK·
fi
; lc ← getLabel; ...〉
−→ 〈Σ′1| do lc ← getLabel; n ← newReffi (lc ⊔ (l
′ ⊔ l)) ⊥; ...〉
(Σ′1 = Σ1 [lcur 7→ Σ1.lcur ⊔ l ])
−→ 〈Σ′1| do n ← newReffi (lc ⊔ (l
′ ⊔ l)) ⊥; copyRef i n; ...〉
−→ 〈Σ′′1 | do copyRef i n;writeReffi (JRef
TCB
fs aK
·
fi) n〉
(Σ′′1 = Σ
′
1 [µfi 7→ Σ
′
1.µfi [n 7→ Lb
TCB (lc ⊔ (l ′ ⊔ l)) ⊥ ] ])
−→ 〈Σ′′′1 |writeReffi (JRef
TCB
fs aK
·
fi) n〉
(Σ′′′1 = Σ
′′
1 [µfi 7→ Σ
′′
1 .µfi [n 7→ Lb
TCB (lc ⊔ (l ′ ⊔ l)) v ] ])
−→ 〈Σ′′′1 |return ()〉
(Σ′′′′1 = Σ
′′′
1 [µfi 7→ Σ
′′′
1 .µfi [a 7→ Lb
TCB l (Ref TCBfi (lc ⊔ l
′ ⊔ l) n)]])
Finally, this allows us to conclude (from the rule for toLabeled), that
〈Σ1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [toLabeled l
′ (µ Σ1.lcur)]〉
−→ 〈Σ2|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [return ()]〉
where Σ2 = (Σ1.lcur, Σ
′′′′
1 .µfi). Now we can check that JΣ
′Kfi = Σ2 from the
definition of J·Kfi for states.
Case E [downgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs a) l
′ ].
We have 〈Σ|E [downgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs a) l
′ ]〉 −→ 〈Σ′|E [return ()]〉,
where Σ.µfs (a) = Lb
TCB l (LbTCB l ′′ v), Σ′ = Σ [µfs 7→ Σ.µfs [a 7→
LbTCB l (LbTCB (l ⊔ l ′′ ⊓ l ′) ⊥)]], and we know that Σ.lcur ⊑ l .
Let Σ1 = JΣKfi. Then there exists a function µ such that:
〈Σ1|JE [downgradefs (Ref
TCB
fs a) l
′ ]KΣfi 〉
−→ 〈Σ1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [toLabeled (Σ1.lcur ⊔ l) (µ Σ1.lcur)]〉
We now step through the evaluation of 〈Σ1|µ Σ1.lcur〉, as follows:
〈Σ1|µ Σ1.lcur〉
−→ 〈Σ1| do i ← readRefJRefTCB
fs
aK·
fi
; lc ← getlabel ; ...〉
−→ 〈Σ′1| do lc ← getLabel; n ← newReffi (lc ⊔ (l
′ ⊓ l)) ⊥; ...〉
(Σ′1 = Σ1 [lcur 7→ Σ1.lcur ⊔ l ])
−→ 〈Σ′1| do n ← newReffi (lc ⊔ (l
′ ⊓ l)) ⊥;writeReffi (JRef
TCB
fs aK
·
fi) n〉
−→ 〈Σ′′1 |writeReffi (JRef
TCB
fs aK
·
fi) n〉
(Σ′′1 = Σ
′
1 [µfi 7→ Σ
′
1.µfi [n 7→ Lb
TCB (lc ⊔ (l ′ ⊓ l)) ⊥ ] ])
−→ 〈Σ′′′1 |return ()〉
Finally, this allows us to conclude (from the rule for toLabeled), that
〈Σ1|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [toLabeled l
′ (µ Σ1.lcur)]〉
−→ 〈Σ2|(JEK
Σ
fi ) [return ()]〉
where Σ2 = (Σ1.lcur, Σ
′′′
1 .µfi). Now we can check that JΣ
′Kfi = Σ2 from the
definition of J·Kfi for states.
Now we can state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem. [Embedding λLIOℓ,fs in λ
LIO
ℓ ] Let t be a well-typed term in λ
LIO
ℓ,fs. Then
if 〈Σ|t〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′|v〉, we have 〈JΣKfi|JtK
Σ
fi 〉 −→
∗ 〈JΣ′Kfi|JvK
Σ
fi 〉, and if 〈Σ|t〉 −→
∗
〈Σ′|⇑〉, then 〈JΣKfi|JtK
Σ
fi 〉 −→
∗ 〈JΣ′Kfi|⇑〉.
Proof. By induction on the number of steps in 〈Σ|t〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′|v〉, using Lemma 2
and uniqueness of normal forms in λLIOℓ .
